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”An equilibrium does not appear be-
cause agents are rational, but rather
agents appear to be rational because an
equilibrium has been reached.[. . . ] The
task for game theory is to formulate a
notion of rationality.”
Larry Samuelson [20, p. 3]
Abstract. Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of
rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their
software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and
genes, interacting with each other and with the environment. Rational
behaviors are achieved not only through conscious reasoning, but also
through spontaneous stabilization at equilibrium points.
Formal theories of rationality are usually guided by informal intuitions,
which are acquired by observing some concrete economic, biological, or
network processes. Treating such processes as instances of computation,
we reconstruct and refine some basic notions of equilibrium and ratio-
nality from the some basic structures of computation.
It is, of course, well known that equilibria arise as fixed points; the point
is that semantics of computation of fixed points seems to be providing
novel methods, algebraic and coalgebraic, for reasoning about them.
1 Introduction
Game theory studies distributed processes where the resources are shared among
the agents with different, inconsistent, and often adversarial goals. Originally
devised as a tool of economics, politics, and warfare, game theory recently be-
came an indispensable tool of algorithmics, especially as the processes and the
problems of computation spread from computers to networks. The other way
around, the algorithmic aspects of game theory have attracted a lot of attention
on their own, leading to fruitful interactions between economics and algorithmics
[7,15,22].
⋆ Supported by ONR and EPSRC.
In semantics of computation, often viewed as the stylistic dual of algorith-
mics, the paradigm of game also played a crucial role, and led to the solutions of
some deep and long standing problems [1,11]; yet the resulting toolkit of game
semantics [2] remained largely disjoint from the game theoretic methods, and
concerns. While this may very well be justified by the different, and perhaps
even disjoint goals of game semantics and game theory, the growing importance
of the computational aspects of game theory continues to spur the explorations
of a different conceptual link: If gaming is computation, which semantical and
programming methodologies apply to it?
The present paper provides a belated account of some initial explorations in
this direction, going back to a joint project with Samson Abramsky. The up-
shot is that the basic models of computation readily extend to capture the basic
notions of game theory: the tools for reasoning about choice, be it possibilis-
tic or probabilistic, and the tools to compute fixed points of possibilistic and
probabilistic processes, turn out to be readily applicable to designing and pro-
gramming strategic behavior. The approach seems promising in both directions:
on one hand, the semantical view of games provides a convenient formal frame-
work for conceptual analyses and concrete computations of response profiles and
equilibria; the other way around, the game theoretic view of the computational
processes opens an alley towards modeling a wide range of network interactions
of increasing practical interest.
As a running example, we use what may be the smallest and the deepest
problem of game theory: Prisoners’ Dilemma. In its standard solution, traditional
game theory recommends selfishness as the only rational strategy here, although
”staying the course” of this strategy leads to an ostensive loss for everyone. Can
our semantical tools dispel the irrationality of this standard solution, and pro-
vide a better model of rationality? We propose and analyze several refinements
of the basic model of strategic reasoning, and show how the implementations of
the optimization task of gaming can be refined, and their rationality improved.
Some familiar semantical tools turn out to allow computing more informative
equilibria, e.g. where players’ preferences are quantified, rather than just par-
tially ordered, and where the payoffs can be used dynamically (e.g. reinvested, or
discounted), and not just accrued. This seems to suggest that applying seman-
tical methodologies to program strategies may offer some new solutions, besides
being fun.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 sketches a bird’s eye view of program and
process semantics, and points to the place of games in that landscape. In sec-
tion 3, we reconstruct the familiar notions of Nash equilibrium and evolutionary
stable strategy, as they could be obtained by running relational (nondetermin-
istic) programs. We also discuss some nonstandard equilibrium concepts, which
can be easily designed and implemented in this framework. In section 4, we lift
these equilibrium concepts from the relational to a stochastic framework, where
they can be obtained as stationary distributions of Markov chains. In order to
remain close to the usual game-theoretic models, in both these sections games
are viewed as stateless processes. In section 5, we discuss the role of state, i.e.
position, in semantics of gaming. Section 6 summarizes the paper.
2 Program and process semantics of games
Semantics of a natural language evolves through speech and through use of
the language. Semantics of a programming language requires moreover a design
effort, because it concerns not only communication between people, but also
programming computers, and they need to be designed before they are built.
However, as the notion of a computer is changing from a machine in a box to a
world wide network, the simple notion of a program diversifies. Some programs
acquire strategic, i.e. game theoretic aspects. We sketch a way to capture these
aspects in a well studied framework of fixed point semantics, where coalgebras
are always present in one way or another.
2.1 Program semantics
In categorical semantics, a program is denoted by an arrow A
f // B in a cat-
egory D, where the objects A and B denote some data types, of the inputs and
of the outputs of f , respectively. It is assumed that the category D has cartesian
products , so that we can also represent a program A× C
g // B ×D ×X with
multiple inputs and multiple outputs.
But running a program does not just map data to data; it also causes a whole
range of other observable effects. E.g., a computation may not terminate, or it
may terminate with several possible outputs for the same input; or it may change
the state of the computer, or of another resource. Such computational effects can
be captured by computational monads [13]. Originally proposed as a tool of se-
mantics, monads have been widely endorsed as a convenient programming tool
[23]. In the meantime, an alternative presentation of essentially equivalent se-
mantical structure has been proposed, in terms of premonoidal categories [19].
The category D of data types, with cartesian products and simple deterministic
maps between them, is extended to a category C with the same data types as ob-
jects, but with the computations with nontrivial effects as its morphisms. Along
the inclusion D 
 // C, the cartesian products of D are mapped into the pre-
monoidal tensor products in C. The relevant semantical structure is sometimes
called Freyd category [18].
While the models of games that involve some of the well-studied computa-
tional effects seem quite interesting for future research, in the present paper we
only consider the simplest effects of the choice operations, and in particular of
the possibilistic (relational) and probabilisitic (randomized) choice. The reason
is that these choice operations already come about in game theory, so that we
can display some familiar ideas from a slightly different angle.
From the rich tool chest of program semantics, we shall thus consider only
two simple but fundamental categories of computations:
– FRel of finite sets and relations, and
– SRel of finite sets and stochastic relations.
A morphism in either of these categories will be denoted by a crossed arrow
 // . While a binary relation A
R // B in FRel can be viewed as a matrix
B × A
R // {0, 1}, a stochastic relation A
P // B in SRel is a matrix B ×
A
P // [0, 1], i.e. P = (pji)B×A, where pji ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
j∈B pji = 1 holds for
all i ∈ A. Intuitively, the entry pji can thus be viewed as the probability that
the input i ∈ A will result in the output j ∈ B. The composition in SRel is the
matrix composition. Both categories of computations C = FRel, SRel have the
same cartesian subcategory of deterministic maps D = Set. They both happen
to be monoidal, rather than premonoidal.
2.2 Processes and controls
We model processes simply as programs that depend on a state, and may change
it. If the state space is represented by an object X in a category of computations
C, then a process is thus a morphism A×X
R // B ×X . Since every category
of computations inherits along the inclusion D 
 // C the cartesian diagonals
A
δ // A×A and the projections A×B
π1 // A and A×B
π2 // B , we can
separate the data part and the state part of a process as
– RB : A×X
R // B ×X
π1 // B and
– RX : A×X
R // B ×X
π2 // X .
A process can be ongoing, and its outputs may be used to determine the inputs
to be fed back into it. This is expressed through feedback B ×X
φ // A . To
stabilize a process, a control X
γ // A can be extracted as a fixed point
A×X
R // B ×X B ×X
φ // A
A×X
R // B ×X
φ // A
X
γ=FixA(φ◦R) //
_〈γ,id〉

A
A×X

R
// B ×X
_φ
OO
Such fixed point operations play a central role in modeling processes and controls.
We shall see that they play a central role in modeling games. The fixed point
operations in FRel and SRel are spelled out in the Appendix.
For a categorical insider, we add that any Freyd-category [18] with a family
of Conway fixed point operators [6,21] should suffice for the (as yet putative)
research in abstract game theory. Equivalently, a traced Freyd category will do
as well [4].
Examples. The simplest example of a process is a Mealy machine. A deter-
ministic one is simply a function A×X // B ×X . A nondeterministic (pos-
sibilistic) one is a relation A×X
 // B ×X . A probabilistic automaton can in
principle be viewed as a stochastic relation of the same type, just in SRel rather
than in FRel. Other examples of processes include Markov chains. . . and even
games.
2.3 Games as processes
An m-player game is a process A×X
̺ // B ×X where the inputs, the outputs
and the state consist of m components, i.e.
A =
∏
i∈m
Ai B =
∏
i∈m
Bi X =
∏
i∈m
Xi
where we represent ordinals following von Neumann, in the formm = {0, 1, . . . ,m−
1}. The inputs Ai are thought of as themoves available to the i-th player; the out-
puts Bi are her payoffs; the states in Xi are the positions that she can observe.
The payoff types Bi are usually ordered, and this ordering expresses player’s
preference.
Games can thus be viewed as a special case of controllable processes, de-
scribed in the preceding section. The optimization task of control is, however,
slightly different. First of all, it is distributed: instead of a global control, each
player designs and implements an individual strategy. And secondly, these strate-
gies are not designed using feedback, to respond to the outputs, but rather to
respond to the inputs supplied by the other players:
A×X
̺ // B ×X
(b)
A−i ×Xi
RSi // Ai
(bb)
A×X
RS=〈RSi◦πi〉i∈m // A
(n)
X
RS
•=FixA(RS) //
P
PPPP
〈RS•,id〉 ((PP
PPP
A
A×X
.nnnnn RS
77nnnnn
At step (b), each player i implements her rationality through a response relation
RSi to all of the opponents’ moves, which are chosen from
A−i =
∏
k∈m, k 6=i
Ak
At step (bb), the individual response relations RSi are gathered into the response
profile RS, which is simply the m-tuple of the relations RSi.
Finally, at step (n), the equilibrium RS• is computed, as the fixed point of
the response profile RS. The equilibrium is an m-tuple of relations X
RS
•
i // Ai .
It tells, for each position from X , how will the game be played if each player
responds by RSi to everyone else’s responses RS−i = 〈RSk ◦ πk〉k∈m\{i}. The
equilibrium is thus the global (social) result of the local (individual) preferences
and of distributed reasoning (programming) in pursuit of these preferences.
How does an equilibrium come about? The usual explanation is that each
player i knows everyone’s preferences, and can thus construct RSk, for all k ∈ m,
on her own, and thus compute the profile RS and the equilibrium RS• =
Fix(RS). But this explanation should be taken as a metaphor. In reality, equilib-
ria are often reached e.g. in biological systems, and in other genuinely distributed
processes, where the agents do not perform explicit local computations, or reason
about each other. Moreover, even in the cases where all strategies and their fixed
points could conceivably be computed at each node, the fact that there are usu-
ally many equilibria gives rise to the question how do the players coordinate to
meet at one equilibrium. This is where game theory enters the conceptual realm
of ”invisible hand” and equilibrium selection [20]. Modeling such genuinely dis-
tributed processes is one of the most interesting challenges of the computational
semantics of gaming.
In the rest of the paper, we explore more closely each of the steps in the
above derivation of the response strategies and equilibria. We begin with step
(b), where each player ”programs” her response to other players’ possible moves.
3 Strategies as nondeterministic programs
To reconstruct the first concepts of standard game theory, we first consider one
shot games, i.e. where X = 1. This is standard in traditional game theory,
where it is assumed that each player chooses a strategy in advance, and plays it
out no matter what. The notion of position, or state, is thus abstracted away.
Another standard assumption is that the payoffs are uniquely determined for
each player, by mapping each tuple of moves in A to a tuple of payoffs in B.
The game thus boils down to a function A
̺ // B . If there are 2 players, called
0 and 1, and if their payoffs are in B0 = B1 = R, this gives the usual bimatrix
form A0 ×A1
̺ // R× R . If there are 3 players, the game can be viewed as 3
tri-matrices, etc.
Even if the game, represented by the functions that compute the payoffs, is
completely deterministic, the fact that the players need to choose between the
various possible moves makes their strategies into nondeterministic programs.
In this section, we view them as relations; later we view them as stochastic
relations.
3.1 Designing and refining relational strategies
We assume that the payoff types Bi are ordered, and that the players prefer
higher payoffs. Each of them thus programs a response strategy towards the
goal of maximizing his payoffs. We first consider some simple implementations,
and then show how they can be refined.
A. Best response simply maximizes the payoff
s−i BRi si ⇐⇒ ∀ti ∈ Ai. ̺i(ti, s−i) ≤ ̺i(si, s−i)
B. Stable response refines the view by taking the possible opponents’ re-
sponses into account:
s−i SRi si ⇐⇒ ∀ti ∈ Ai. ̺i(ti, s−i) ≤ ̺i(si, s−i) ∧
(̺i(ti, s−i) = ̺i(si, s−i)⇒
∀t−i ∈ A−i. ̺i(ti, t−i) ≤ ̺i(si, t−i))
The idea is that a stable response si to s−i should remain optimal in some
neighborhood of s−i. When the payoff function ̺i is linear, it is easy to prove
that the above definition captures this. Indeed, if the opponents deviate from
s−i and play (1 − ε)s−i + εt−i for a small ε > 0, then a stable response si will
still be the best, because the validity of
(1− ε)̺i(si, s−i) + ε̺i(si, t−i) ≥ (1 − ε)̺i(ti, s−i) + ε̺i(ti, t−i)
for all ti, follows from the above definition of SRi.
C. Uniform response goes a step further by taking the opponents’ best re-
sponse into account:
s−i URi si ⇐⇒ s−i BRi si ∧
∀t−i ∈ A−i. si BR−i t−i ⇒ t−i BRi si
where si BR−i t−i abbreviates ∀k ∈ m. k 6= i ⇒ (si, t−i,k) BRk tk. The best
response si is thus required to remain optimal not only with respect to s−i, but
also with respect to the opponents’ best responses to the profiles that include
si. This is a rational, but very strong requirement: the relation URi may be
empty. We mention it as a first attempt to refine the response by anticipating
opponents’ responses to it. The next example proceeds in this direction, while
assuring a nonempty set of responses.
D. Constructive response. While the uniform response captures the best
responses to all of the opponent’s responses, the constructive response relation
also capture the responses that may not be the best responses to a fixed oppo-
nent’s move, but are better than what the best response would turn into in the
context of opponent’s rational responses to it.
s−i CRi si ⇐⇒ ∀ti ∈ Ai. ̺i(si, s−i) < ̺i(ti, s−i)⇒
∃t−i ∈ A−i. ̺−i(ti, t−i) > ̺−i(ti, s−i) ∧
̺i(ti, t−i) < ̺i(si, s−i)
Example. Prisoners’ Dilemma is a famous 2-player game, usually presented
with a single state X = 1 and two moves, ”cooperate” and ”defect”, thus A0 =
A1 = {c, d}, and B0 = B1 = R. Players’ preferences are given by a payoff
function ̺ = 〈̺0, ̺1〉 : {c, d}× {c, d} // R×R which can be presented by the
bimatrix
10 11
10 0
0 1
11 1
telling that ̺0(c, c) = ̺1 = 10, ̺0(c, d) = 0, ̺1(c, d) = 11 etc. The point is
that players’ local reasoning leads to globally suboptimal outcome: each player
seems forced to play d, because he wins more whether the opponent plays c or
d; but if both players play d they both win less than if they both play c. The
constructive response allows the players to keep the strategy c as a candidate
solution. Although ̺0(c, c) gives lower payoff than ̺0(d, c), the player 0 knows
that the profile (d, c) is unlikely to happen, because ̺1(d, d) > ̺1(d, c). So he
keeps (c, c) as better than (d, d).
Of course, this form of rationality does not offer the worst case protection,
and may not seem rational at all, because there is no guarantee that (c, c) will
happen either. Indeed, ̺1(c, d) > ̺1(c, c) is likely to motivate player 1 to defect,
which leads to the worst outcome for player 0, since ̺0(c, d) < ̺0(c, c).
However, if player 1 follows the rationality of CR, and not BR, then he’ll
also consider cooperating, because of the threat that player 0 would retaliate in
response to his defection, and ̺1(d, d) < ̺1(c, c). So the possibility of the solution
(c, c) depends on whether the players share the same rationalityCR. This sharing
cannot be coordinated in the relational model of one-round Prisoners’ Dilemma.
We shall later see how some more precise models do allow this.
3.2 Playing out the strategies: computing the equilibria
For each of the described notions of response, we now consider the corresponding
notion of equilibrium, derived at step (n) in section 2.3. The relational fixed point
operators are described in the Appendix.
A. Rationalizability and the Nash equilibrium. The Nash best response
relations yield the system of n relations BR, which we write as
s BR t ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ n. s−i BRi ti
It is not hard to see that the strong fixed point (see appendix) yields the solutions
of that system, i.e.
BR•s ⇐⇒ s BR s
⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ n. s−i BRi si
This, of course, means that s is a Nash equilibrium [14]. On the other hand, the
weak fixed point extracts the transitive closure of BR, i.e. the smallest relation
BR∗ satisfying
BR∗s ⇐⇒ ∃t. BR∗t ∧ tBRs
In game theory, the strategies {si | BR
∗
i si} are said to be rationalizable [5,17].
An si is rationalizable if and only if there is a rationalizable counterstrategy t−i
for which si is the best response.
B. Stable Strategies. Given
s SR t ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ n. s−i SRi ti
the fixed point
SR•s ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ n. s−i SRi si
⇐⇒ ∀t ∈ A.∀i ∈ n. ̺i(ti, s−i) ≤ ̺i(si, s−i) ∧
̺i(si, t−i) = ̺i(si, s−i)⇒
∀t−i ∈ A−i. ̺i(ti, t−i) ≤ ̺i(si, t−i)
is an evolutionary stable strategy, which is a straightforward generalization of
the concept due to biologist John Maynard-Smith [12]1. On the other hand, the
weak fixed point
SR∗s ⇐⇒ ∃t.SR∗t ∧ tSRs
yields the new class of stably rationalizable strategies. Unfolding the above equiv-
alence tells that s is stably rationalizable iff every si is the best response for some
stably rationalizable t−i, and moreover, whenever ti is another best response to
t−i, as good as si, then si is at least as good as ti with respect to the other
counterstrategies.
C. Uniform equilibria and profiles.
UR• (si, s−i) ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ n. s−i URi si
⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ n. s−i BRi si ∧
∀t−i ∈ A−i. si BR−i t−i ⇒ t−i BRi si
where BR−i is like in 3.1C. A uniform equilibrium s is thus a Nash equilibrium
such that each its components si is a uniform move, in the sense that it lies in
the set
Ui = {si ∈ Ai| ∀t−i ∈ A−i. si BR−i t−i ⇒ t−iBRisi}
1 He considered the symmetric case, where all players have the same preferences and
the same choice of actions.
A Nash equilibrium thus fails to be uniform whenever some opponent has an
alternative best response. The uniformity of a response i-th player assures that
it is the best response also with respect to such alternatives. In a sense, the
uniformity requirement only eliminates the unreliable Nash equilibria from the
search space.
The weak fixed point
UR∗ s ⇐⇒ ∃t.UR∗t ∧ tURs
yields the new class of uniformly rationalizable strategies. Unfolding the above
equivalence tells that s is uniformly rationalizable iff every si is a uniform best
response for some uniformly rationalizable t−i.
D. Constructive equilibrium.
CR• s ⇐⇒ ∀i.s−iCRisi
As it stands, this equilibrium includes the Nash equilibria, and the fixed points of
CR, chosen because they yield better payoff than the equilibria. While CR itself
does not guarantee the feasilibity of any CRi-response of a particular player, the
CR-equilibrium does guarantee that all players have the same CR-justification.
Remark. The above characterizations of equilibria guarantee provide no ex-
istence guarantees: e.g., the set BR• of the Nash equilibria, of course, always
exists, but it can be empty. The existence, of course, requires additional side
conditions, such as the convexity of the set of strategies [14].
Example. For Prisoners’ Dilemma, both (c, c) and (d, d) are constructive equi-
libria. The former is unstable, since each player can improve her immediate
payoff by defecting. This gain can be offset by the loss from retaliation, and can
be irrational, especially if the value of (c, c) is much larger than the value of
(d, d).
But the relational view of the strategic choices cannot express these quan-
titative considerations. In the next section, we explore a refinement where they
can be expressed.
4 Strategies as randomized programs
In this section, we consider the framework where the preferences are quantified:
the strategic choices are expressed as probability distributions over the available
moves. A strategy is thus a randomized program.2 — Is it possible to improve
the rationality of strategic behaviors by quantifying the preferences, and biasing
them more towards the more favorable moves?
2 The payoff functions can also be viewed as randomized programs, capturing games
that involve some form of gambling. But this leads to an essentially different type of
game theory[9].
In the standard game theoretic reasoning, the payoffs are only used as a
convenient way to express players’ preference ordering. Indeed, any affine trans-
formation of a payoff matrix represents the same game. In the present section,
this is not the case any more. We assume that all payoffs are non-negative, and
normalize them into probability distributions.
A. Best response distribution is just a normalization of the payoff function:
s−i BDi si =
̺i(si, s−i)∑
ti∈Ai
̺i(ti, s−i)
where Ai ×A−i
BDi// [0, 1] is viewed as a fuzzy relation A−i
BDi// Ai . The idea is
that s−i BDi si (which can be viewed as the matrix entry in the row si and the
column s−i) records not only that si is the best response to s−i, like BRi did,
i.e. not just that si is preferred to the other responses ti; but s−i BDi si also
quantifies how much better is si than ti, in terms of the difference (s−i BDi si)−
(s−i BDi ti).
B. Stable response distribution measures not only how good is si as a
response to s−i, but also how good is it, on the average, with respect to the
other countermoves t−i.
s−i SDi si =
̺i(si, s−i) ·
∑
t−i∈A−i
̺i(si, t−i)∑
ti∈Ai
̺i(ti, s−i) ·
∑
t−i∈A−i
̺i(ti, t−i)
Like in the case of the relational stable response, if si and ti yield are equally
good as responses to s−i, then si remains a stable response if it is at least as
good as ti with respect to all other countermoves t−i. Moreover, si will now
remain stable even if it is not as good as ti with respect to each other t−i, but
just if it is as good on the average. In fact, if si is much better than ti on the
average, the probability s−i SDi si may be greater than s−i SDi ti, even if
̺i(si, s−i) < ̺i(ti, s−i).
C. Uniform response distribution multiplies the probability of a response
si to s−i by the payoffs from the response si to all other countermoves t−i,
averaged by the likelihood that t−i may occur as the countermove against si,
which is taken to be proportional with ̺−i(si, t−i).
s−i UDi si =
̺i(si, s−i) ·
∑
t−i∈A−i
̺i(si, t−i) · ̺−i(si, t−i)∑
ti∈Ai
̺i(ti, s−i) ·
∑
t−i∈A−i
̺i(ti, t−i) · ̺−i(ti, t−i)
If it happens that si is a good response across all the best countermoves t−i
against it, then si is assigned a high uniform response probability. This was
expressed in the uniform response relation too. The preference is now not only
quantified, but also smoothened out, as to have a high uniform response prob-
ability as soon as is a good response to the likely countermoves just on the
average.
D. Constructive response distribution To simplify notation for a sequence
of values 〈f(s, y)〉s∈A renormalized into a probability distribution over A, we
shall henceforth write
⌊f(s, y)⌋s =
f(s, y)∑
t∈A f(t, y)
The upshot is that we get
∑
s∈A ⌊f(s, y)⌋s = 1. The subscript s, denoting the
renormalized variable, will be omitted when clear from the context.
We also write
a+ =
{
a if a > 0
0 otherwise
}
=
|a|+ a
2
Now define
s−i CDi si =
⌊
̺i(si, s−i)
+
∨
ti∈Ai
(
̺i(ti, s−i)− ̺i(si, s−i)
)
+
·
∑
t−i∈A−i
(
̺−i(ti, t−i)− ̺−i(ti, s−i)
)
+
·
(
̺i(si, s−i)− ̺i(ti, t−i)
)
+
⌋
si
The idea behind constructive distribution is that the probabilistic weight of si
as a response to s−i is now increased to equal the weight of a ti that may be a
better response to s−i alone, but for which there is a threat of the countermoves
t−i, which are better for the opponent than s−i, but worse for the player.
Examples. Response distributions for Prisoners’ Dilemma are now
BDi =
(
10
21 0
11
21 1
)
SDi =
(
25
58 0
33
58 1
)
UDi =
(
1000
1011 0
11
1011 1
)
CDi =
(
19
30 0
11
30 1
)
where the columns represent the opponent’s moves c and d, the rows the player’s
own responses, and the entries the suggested probability for each response.
Stochastic equilibria. Stochastic response profiles are Markov chains, and the
induced equilibria are their stationary distributions. Playing out the randomized
response strategies and computing stochastic equilibria is thus placed in a rich
and well ploughed field [16].
A stochastic Nash equilibrium is a uniform fixed point BD• = Fix(BD),
which can be computed as in Appendix B. Since each player participating in
the profile BD responds by a mixed strategy where the frequency of a move is
proportional to the payoff that it yields, the condition BD• = BD ◦BD• means
that BD• maximizes everyone’s average payoff. Formally, this is a consequence
of the fact that BD is a stochastic matrix, and that 1 is its greatest eigenvalue,
so that the images of the vectors in the eigenspace of 1 are of maximal length.
The stochastic equilibria SB•, UB• and CB• maximize players’ average
payoffs in a similar manner, albeit for more refined notions of averaging, captured
by their more refined response distributions.
Back to the Dilemma. The strategies UD and CD above recommend coop-
eration as a better response to peer’s cooperation. One might thus hope that, by
taking into account the average payoffs, the stochastic approach may overcome
the myopic rationality of defection as the equilibrium in Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Unfortunately, it is easy to see the only fixed point of any response disrribution
in the form RD =
(
p 0
1− p 1
)
is the vector
(
0
1
)
, as soon as p < 1. Defection is
the only equilibrium.
Let us try to understand why. Suppose that it is assured that both players
play a constructive strategy. If they both assume that the other one will coop-
erate, each of them will cooperate at the first step with a probability 1930 , which
seems favorable. However, under the same assumption, the probability that ei-
ther of them will cooperate at both of the first two steps is
(
19
30
)2
= 361900 , which
is not so favorable. And it exponentially converges to 0. With a static strategy
repeated over and over, any probability p that the opponent will cooperate in
one step leads to the probability pn that he will cooperate in n steps, which be-
comes 0 in the long run. Trust and cooperation require memory and adaptation,
which can be implemented in position games.
5 Position and memory
The positions in a position game A×X
̺ // B ×X are recorded in the state
space X =
∏
i∈mXi, where the projection Xi shows what is visible to the player
i. In games of perfect information, all of X is visible to all players. Even if the
payoff function A×X
̺B // B , the players can use the positions to adapt their
strategies, and A×X
̺X // X should update the position as each move is made.
For instance, in Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, each player chooses a sequence
of moves σi = 〈s
0
i , s
1
i , . . . , s
n
i 〉 and collects at each step the payoff ̺(s
ℓ
0, s
ℓ
1). But
the moves sℓi can be chosen adaptively, taking into account the previous ℓ moves.
These moves can be recorded as the position. E.g., set X = ({c, d} × {c, d})
∗
,
and besides the payoff bimatrix {c, d}2
̺B //
R
2 , declare the position update
{c, d}2
̺X // ({c, d}2)∗ to be the list function ̺X(s, x) = s :: x. What are the
rational strategies now?
Axelrod reports about the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma tournaments in [3].
E.g., one of the simplest and most successful strategies was tit-for-tat. It uses a
rudimentary notion of position, recording just the last move: i.e., X = {c, d}2,
and {c, d}2
̺X // {c, d}2 is the identity function. The tit-for-tat strategy X
TTi // Ai
is simply to repeat opponent’s last move:
〈x0, x1〉 TT0 x1 〈x0, x1〉 TT1 x0
If both players stick with this strategy, then they will
– either forever cooperate, or forever defect — if they agree initially,
– or forever alternate — if they initially disagree.
Within an n-round iterated game, this is clearly not an equilibrium strategy,
since each player can win that game by switching any c to d. However, both
players’ total gains in the game will be higher if they cooperate. That is why
a cooperative strategy may be rational when the cumulative gains within a
tournament are taken into account, while it may not be a rational way to win a
single party of the same game, or to assure a higher payoff from a single move.
The upshot is that a game, viewed in strategic form, may thus lead to three
completely different games, depending on whether the payoffs are recorded per
move, or per n rounds against the same opponent, or per tournament against
many opponents playing different strategies. While the different situations ar-
guably determine different rationalities, which can be captured by different nor-
mal forms, the process view of a game, with the various positions through which
it may evolve, displays not only the semantical relations between the different
views of the same game, but also a dynamical view of adaptive strategies.
As a final example, consider a version of Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, where
the positions X = R × R record the cumulative gains of both players. The
cumulative payoff function and the position update function thus happen to be
identical, {c, d}2 × R2
̺ //
R2 . To give the game a sense of the moment, let us
assume that the gains are subject to a galloping inflation rate of 50% per round,
i.e. that the cumulative payoffs are given by the bimatrix
10 + x12 11 +
x0
2
10 + x02
x0
2
x1
2 1 +
x1
2
11 + x02 1 +
x0
2
where x = 〈x0, x1〉 ∈ R
2 is the position, i.e. the previous gains. Suppose that the
player uses the position-sensitive form of the constructive rationality
(s−i, x) CDi si =
⌊
̺i(si, s−i, x)
+
∨
ti∈Ai
(
̺i(ti, s−i, x) − ̺i(si, s−i, x)
)
+
·
∑
t−i∈A−i
(
̺−i(ti, t−i, ξ)− ̺−i(ti, s−i, ξ)
)
+
·
(
̺i(si, s−i, ξ)− ̺i(ti, t−i, ξ)
)
+
⌋
si
where ξ = ̺X(ti, s−i, x) is the position reached after the profile (ti, s−i) is played
at the position x. The response distribution is then
CDi(x) =
(
38+x
60+2x
x
2+2x
22+x
60+2x
2+x
2+2x
)
Since x changes at each step, the profile CD is not a Markov chain any more.
Its fixed point is cumbersome to compute explicitly, although it converges fast
numerically. In any case, it is intuitively clear that the high inflation rate moti-
vates the players to cooperate. If they do, the cumulative payoff for each of them
approaches $10 ·
∑∞
k=0
1
2k
= $20. If they both defect, their cumulative payoffs
are $1 ·
∑∞
k=0
1
2k = $2. If they begin to cooperate and accumulate $x each, and
then one defects, he will acquire an advantage of $11 for that move. But after 10
further moves, with both players defecting, his advantage will reduce to about 1
cent, and the cumulative payoff for both players will again boil down to $2.
6 Conclusions and future work
We explored the semantical approaches to gaming from three directions: through
relational programming of strategies in section 3, through quantifying preferences
in terms of distributions (rather than preorders) in section 4, and finally by
taking into account the positions and the process aspects of gaming, in section
5.
The advantage of viewing strategies as programs is that they can be refined,
together with the notion of rationality that they express. To illustrate this point,
we discussed in section 3 some simple refinements of the standard equilibrium
concepts.
The advantage of viewing strategies as randomized programs is that the prob-
lem of equilibrium selection [20] can be attacked by the Markov chain methods.
Mixed strategies are, of course, commonly used in game theory. They assure the
existence of Nash equilibria. The mixture is interpreted either as a mixed popu-
lation of players, each playing a single strategy, or as the probability distribution
with which the single player chooses a single strategy [12]. However, when equi-
libria are computed as stationary distributions of Markov chains, the mixture
provides additional information which can be used to coordinate equilibrium se-
lection. The concrete methods to extract and use this information need to be
worked out in future research.
The most interesting feature of the semantical view of games is the dynam-
ics of gaming, as it evolves from position to position. This feature has only
been touched upon in the the present paper. On one hand, it leads beyond the
Markovian realm, and equilibria are harder to compute. But on the other hand,
in practice, the important rational solutions are often attained through genuinely
adaptive, position sensitive strategies. The toy example of Prisoners’ Dilemma
already shows that a widely studied science of rationality may miss even the basic
forms of social rationality because of small technical shortcomings. Combining
semantics of computation and game theory may help eliminate them.
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A Appendix: Fixed points in FRel
For a relation A×X
R // A in the monoidal category (FRel,×, 1), the standard
fixed point operator (induced by its simple trace structure) gives X
R• // A ,
defined
xR•a ⇐⇒ (x, a)Ra
On the other hand, the order structure of FRel induces another fixed point opera-
tor, where X
R∗ // A is defined as the smallest relation satisfying 〈id, R∗〉R = R∗,
i.e.
xR∗a ⇐⇒ ∃c ∈ A. xR∗c ∧ (x, c)Ra
For each x, the set xR∗ = {a | xR∗a} is just the image of the transitive closure
of A
xR // A . It can be defined inductively, as
xR∗a ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ N. xRna, where
xR0a ⇐⇒ ∃a′ ∈ A. (x, a′)Ra
xRn+1a ⇐⇒ ∃c ∈ A. xRnc ∧ (x, c)Ra
or in terms of the image xR(C) = {a | ∃c ∈ C. (x, c)Ra} and
xR∗ =
∞⋂
n=1
xRn(A)
If the containment order on ℘A represents information, so the singletons {a} are
maxima, and A is the minimum, then the above intersection is the least upper
bound, and R∗ is the least fixed point. Indeed, the containment R• ⊆ R∗ means
that in the information order R• ⊒ R∗.
B Appendix: Fixed points in SRel
A stochastic matrix k ×m
H // k can be viewed as anm-tuple of square stochas-
tic matrices k
Hi // k . By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, each Hi has 1 as the
principal eigenvalue. This can also be directly derived from the fact that the
rows of each Hi − I must be linearly dependent, since the sum of the entries of
each of its columns is 0. The fixed vectors of each Hi thus lie in its eigenspace of
1. But this space may be of a high dimension. Which m-tuple of vectors is the
uniform fixed point of H [8,21]?
The uniform fixed points arise from the trace operations [10,4]. Let k ×m
H∗ // k
be formed from the projectors k
H
∗
i // k to the principal eigenspaces of k
Hi // k .
The uniform fixed point m
H• // k of k ×m
H // k can be obtained by tracing
out k in Ĥ = 〈H∗, H∗〉 : k ×m
 // k × k , defined by
ĥ〈v,w〉〈u,i〉 = h
∗
v〈u,i〉h
∗
w〈u,i〉
The uniform fixed point is thus H• = (h•ui)k×m where
h•ui =
⌊∑
w∈k
ĥ〈w,u〉〈w,i〉
⌋
=
∑
w∈k h
∗
w〈w,i〉h
∗
u〈w,i〉∑
v,w∈k h
∗
w〈w,i〉h
∗
v〈w,i〉
To check that this is a fixed point of H , i.e. that H〈H•, I〉 = H• : m  // k ,
note that H˜ = 〈H•, I〉 : m  // k ×m is
h˜uji =
{
h•ui if j = i
0 otherwise
}
=
{ P
w∈k h
∗
w〈w,i〉h
∗
u〈w,i〉P
v,w∈k h
∗
w〈w,i〉
h∗
v〈w,i〉
if j = i
0 otherwise
Now HH˜ = H• : m  // k is satisfied iff
h•ui =
∑
〈v,j〉∈k×m
hu〈v,j〉
⌊∑
w∈k
h∗w〈w,i〉h
∗
u〈w,i〉
⌋
=
⌊∑
w∈k
h∗w〈w,i〉
∑
v∈k
hu〈v,i〉h
∗
v〈w,i〉
⌋
holds for each i ∈ m,u ∈ k. But this is valid because
∑
v∈k hu〈v,i〉h
∗
v〈w,i〉 =
h∗
v〈w,i〉, i.e. HiH
∗
i = H
∗
i holds by the definition of H
∗.
